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Abstract. The CFL (On-the-job Training) programme was introduced in Italy in 1985 with the aim of reducing  
youth unemployment. The new programme offered employers two main advantages: it  exempted them almost 
completely from  payment of payroll taxes and it provided them with  virtually the only opportunity to employ 
people on a basis of fixed term contracts. 
The paper looks at the employment impact of the programme among a subgroup of eligible workers and finds that 
firms taking part increased employment more than non-participating firms by almost 5%. Employers had a strong 
positive reaction to the tax subsidies and to the softening of the rigid employment code.  
The overall effect  of the programme  on youth employment was however  limited, registering only a 1% increase, 
mainly because  about 80%  of  firms never participated.  
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Can employment subsidies and greater labour market flexibility increase job opportunities for 
youth? Revisiting the Italian On-the-job Training Programme 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The CFL, on the Job Training Programme (Contratto di Formazione e Lavoro), was a scheme 
designed to integrate more young people into employment. It was typical of what was happening 
in many European countries after the mid seventies when there was an increase in policies aiming  
to   promote  youth  employment through active labour market policies (ALMP) at a time of 
very high levels of unemployment.  (O’Higgins, 1997, p. 54; Blanchard, 2006). 
The schemes have varied somewhat in form and content over the years and for different 
countries, but are generally characterised by the use of two basic mechanisms 1) increasing the 
skill levels of young workers through training 2) lowering labour costs, by reducing wage 
expectations, and/or reducing the cost of hiring, and/or increasing flexibility for targeted groups of 
workers, particularly in countries with rigid labour markets. High income taxes and over 
protective labour legislation are frequently asserted to be  two of the main causes of the high rates 
of unemployment experienced in Europe in recent decades (OECD, 2006). 
In the eighties, the Italian labour market was characterised by strong protection regulation 
and a rigid system of wage determination. The Charter of Workers’ Rights (Statuto dei lavoratori) 
had established various employment restrictions (in firms with more than 15 employees) on  
hiring and firing procedures, and on the use of temporary labour contracts. Also, a minimum 
wage, generally laid down in sectoral agreements, had been collectively agreed, and applied to all 
workers, with an almost total coverage. 
The CFL programme was introduced in Italy in the last month of 1984 in an  attempt to tackle 
youth unemployment (eligible  participants should be less than 29 years old). The new contract 
had two major advantages: it exempted employers (almost completely) from the payment of 
payroll taxes, and it was virtually the only form of fixed term contract available for use. The 
contract provided a partial reform of the employment protection legislation, introducing an 
automatic termination after a maximum of two years, and a wage subsidy (as well as reduced  
taxes ) that might ease the distortions caused by the minimum wage legislation (Nikell and Bell, 
1997). 
Several papers have found that this type of partial reform is inefficient (Blanchard, Landier, 
2002). In particular, it has been claimed that it induces firms to replace high cost workers with 
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low cost workers, and encourage high turnover and a reduction in skill levels, and that this can 
lead to a waste of know how and intellectual resources.  
On the whole, the impact of programmes targeted at young workers in Europe has been 
mixed. Training programmes in particular have had poor results. However, wage subsidies and tax 
reductions have provided more encouraging findings, but have been accompanied by potential 
displacement and substitution effects that have seldom been taken properly into account (Kluve 
and Schmidt, 2002; Ilo, 2005; Kluve, 2006). 
 By considering the introduction of the CFL programme as an exogenous innovation, this paper 
evaluates its employment impact on a subgroup of eligible workers, those aged 21-29, in two 
provinces in the North Eastern part of Italy (Treviso and Vicenza). The experiences there are 
politically relevant as they show that the programme was conducive to job creation net of 
possible substitution and displacement effects. Firms participating in the programme increased 
employment of  eligible  workers more than non-participants  by almost 5 per cent,  although the 
overall impact in the provinces was small, producing about a 1 per cent employment increase, 
because only one fifth of firms participated. 
This  paper is structured in the following manner.  Section 2 describes the CFL programme, its 
initial structure and subsequent changes. Section 3 sets out the evaluation problem to be 
addressed, formulates the micro-econometric analysis and describes a matching approach. Section 
4 presents the empirical results, and a set of sensitivity analyses to assess the robustness of the 
estimated employment effects. This section also devotes particular attention to exploring the 
linkages between treatment effects, substitution possibilities and different workers’ abilities. 
Section 5 describes CFL reforms that occurred and discusses the programme’s lasting 
consequences. Section 6 examines the causes for the programme’s limited diffusion and provides 
some suggestions for formulating active labour market programmes in Europe to day, and then  
concludes. 
 
2. The CFL Programme 
 
The CFL was a fixed-term contract introduced at the end of 1984 in order to facilitate the 
engagement of young workers in the labour market. The CFL programme was aimed at public and 
private firms hiring young people aged between 15 and 29 years, and which at the date of 
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application had no recent record of mass redundancies.  The programme included the provision of 
training under a scheme endorsed by the Regional Commission for Employment1.  
The CFL contained a number of benefits. First of all, Social Security contributions paid by 
participating Italian firms were reduced to 2,5 Euros per capita, a substantial reduction, as the 
payroll tax in Italy amounted to around 40% of a person’s salary, and was one of the largest 
taxes of its  kind in Europe (Contini, 2000). Further, the participants were exempted from the 
usual firing costs associated with the widely used alternative of the open-ended contract, while 
the 24-month “fixed term” duration of the CFL allowed a significant increase in flexibility2. The 
programme offered workers specific on-the-job training so that those hired through the CFL 
were expected to develop a stable and qualified career with the firm. The firm was allowed to 
hire a worker at a lower contract level (two grades down) than  would normally be proscribed by 
his/her qualifications according to the national contract. Entrepreneurs were also able to hire 
workers directly, without applying to the Italian Ufficio di Collocamento (employment office)3, 
which was the usual practice and which meant hiring from a pool of declared unemployed, 
basically on a first-come first-served basis. In 1991, the opportunity to engage in direct hiring 
was extended to all Italian firms and one of the comparative advantages of the programme was 
lost. 
At the beginning, workers eligible for employment in enterprises under the CFL programme 
were young people aged between 15 and 29 years4. In 1994, the eligible age range was changed 
to between 16 and 32 years and eligible workers were extended to include self-employed 
professionals and workers hired by associations and by research centres5. The range of eligible 
workers was thus extended over the years in response to demand, but at the same time the 
financial benefits connected to the contract were progressively reduced. The payroll tax rebate 
was reduced from 98% to 50% and subsequently to 25%. From 1991, firms applying to the 
programme, and that had participated in the past, were required to have hired at least 50% of the 
                                                 
1 The training would subsequently turn out to have been largely ineffective, as shown  by several studies. (Breda 
1993, p. 167). 
2 Fixed-term contracts were introduced in Italy in 1962, but were very strictly limited (covering seasonal activities 
and temporary replacements).  CFL was the first widely diffused fixed-term contract.  It could not be renewed with 
the same training specification.  In fact, the contract was seldom renewed. 
3 With exceptional conditions for apprentices (Law 25, 19.01.1955 art.3). 
4 The upper boundary was 32 years old for the South of Italy and also for those  Northern Italian regions with an 
unemployment rate higher than the national average. 
5 The latter were included by Law n.196, 24.06.1997. Law n.299, 16.05.1994 added a new job training contract to 
the previous one. It offered  a reduced training period   of 12 months, and allowed  employers to be eligible for the 
tax rebate for one year after the CFL contract was transformed into a permanent contract. Employers undertaking the 
12 month CFL were eligible for the rebate only if the contract was transformed. Employers in the southern regions 
continued to enjoy the full rebate. 
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employees that had come to the end of their CFL programme over the previous two years. This 
percentage rose to 60% in 19946. CFL terminated in 1995 (Table 1)7.  
The progressive limitation of the incentives attached to the programme  resulted from two 
factors: firstly, the precarious condition of Italian public finances, and secondly an attempt to 
make the programme more selective,  encouraging  its use by firms with favourable employment 
prospects while discouraging firms that were only interested in the financial bonus (Contini et 
al., 2002). 
The progressive limitation of the incentives attached to the programme  resulted from two 
factors: firstly, the precarious condition of Italian public finances, and secondly an attempt to 
make the programme more selective,  encouraging  its use by firms with favourable employment 
prospects while discouraging firms that were only interested in the financial bonus (Contini et 
al., 2002). 
 
Tab. 1: CFL Rebate on Social Security Tax Payable by Employers. 
Employers:  
Year Artisans; Southern Italians; Employers 
from high unemployment areas 
All others 
from 1.11.1984 to 30.5.1988 About 98% About 98% 
from1.6.1988 to 29.12.1990  About 98% 50% 
from 1.1.1991 onward-… About 98% 25% 
 
The present study is based on VWH (Veneto Worker Histories), a data-set built up at the 
University of Venice from social security files. VWH contains information on all participants in 
the CFL programme in the private sector in the two provinces of Treviso and Vicenza, for the 
years 1975-1997. It includes register-based information on all establishments in the two 
provinces, and on all the employees that were hired by those establishments - even if for just one 
day during the observation period - independent of the worker’s place of residence8. The 
observation unit is the employer-day and is used to build a monthly history of the working life of 
each employee. The choice of location was constrained by data availability, but the two 
provinces make an interesting case study because of the wide diffusion of the scheme there.  
                                                 
6 The percentage was raised to 60% in May 1994. D.L. n.299, 16.05.1994. Lay-offs and firings for misbehaviour  
(per giusta causa) were not considered when calculating the hiring percentage. 
7 It was declared illegitimate by the European Commission on the grounds of unfair competition because the level of 
subsidies were differentiated by territory (firms in the Mezzogiorno had higher incentives) and by type of firm. As 
of today, targeted payroll tax rebates are legitimate only to the extent that new jobs are created by the same 
employer, in addition to existing ones. 
8 The entire working life of all employees that worked at least one day in Treviso and Vicenza, was reconstructed, 
including  periods of work away from Treviso and Vicenza.  
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The paper focuses on young workers of 21 to 29 years of age. For workers aged 21 to –29, 
the CFL was the only alternative available to the “normal” open-ended contract, and so its 
impact can be more accurately measured. The selected group is split into two to take into  
account different characteristics. A 21-24 cohort includes workers that had finished high school 
or military service (if males). A 25-29 cohort includes workers with a college education, and also 
workers with higher skills and work experience. Younger workers aged 16 to 20 are not 
considered because they could take advantage of two “entry contracts”, the CFL and the 
apprentice contract, the effects of which overlapped and this makes identification of the CFL 
impact difficult. 
 
Fig. 1: CFL Workers as a Percentage of all Eligible Workers in Vicenza and Treviso Provinces 
 
 
 
After 1985, when CFL was launched, the programme was immediately and unquestionably 
successful. For many firms, particularly small firms, CFL became a common way to hire young 
people.  In Italy, on average about 25% of hiring in the eligible age cohorts was through the 
programme. In Treviso and Vicenza, workers hired under the programme were almost 15% of the 
eligible employment stock in December 1987, rising to 24% for those aged 21 to 24 (See Figure 
1). The number of CFL workers continued to increase until the first programme reform in 1988,  
then a  more modest growth in 1989 changed into a drastic decline, especially after  the second 
reform of  December 1990;  then it increased once again in the mid nineties, in response to a 
recovering  economy.  
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Table 2 presents the probability of a young worker from Treviso or Vicenza provinces 
moving  from unemployment to employment in the eighties9. Four age cohorts are examined, the 
30-32 cohort acts as a control. 
 
Table 2. The Probability of Transition from Unemployment to Employment in Treviso and  
Vicenza. 
Age cohort 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
16-20 0,58 0,53 0,58 0,71 0,78 0,84 0,86 0,79 
21-24 0,20 0,18 0,19 0,23 0,29 0,32 0,33 0,33 
25-29 0,15 0,13 0,14 0,17 0,22 0,25 0,27 0,28 
30-32 0,07 0,06 0,07 0,09 0,11 0,12 0,14 0,14 
The probability of transition from unemployment to employment is computed as the ratio between associations from 
unemployment (VWH data) and active population (interpolated from the population censuses of 1981 and 1991 
according to the employment rate,  marginally adjusted to fit the proper age class). 
 
The transition probabilities for the four age cohorts are very different in absolute numbers, 
which reflects the progressive decline of young people entering the labour market and the effect 
of increased participation in education. In the pre-CFL years (1982-1984) the four age cohorts 
are fairly stable. The age class 16-20 has a distinct pattern of its own, with a rapid decline 
beginning in 1989 which reflects decisions to attend high school in large numbers and is not of 
much interest to our analysis. The cohort (21-29) shows in the first year of the programme 
(1984-85) a positive increase in the probability of transition to employment which is greater than 
that of the age group 30-32. This difference is reinforced in 1986 and 1987 (During the period 
1985-87 there was an increase of  +53% in transition numbers for the 21-24 cohort, but only 
+13% for the 16-20  group and  +43% for the 30-32 age class), but then declines in the following 
couple of years.  
Such evidence is at the root of the success claimed for the CFL programme, but it is very 
difficult to assess the extent to which it the CFL program was responsible for the increase in 
employment among those eligible to participate. A simple comparison between pre-programme 
and post-programme outcomes may be distorted by other parallel events, particularly  increasing 
participation  in education which  tends to delay the entrance age in the labour market -  such that 
this in itself might in part be the cause of reduced unemployment levels, implying thereby that 
                                                 
9 In the eighties the structure of labour supply was strongly influenced by the baby boom in the early sixties and the 
subsequent rapid decline in the population birth rate; by the rapid increase in school attendance (Canu, Tattara, 
2004); and by the increase in average life expectancy. 
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the effect of CFL might not be as great as would first appear. In order to control for such  
potential biases we set the evaluation problem in an econometric framework. 
3. The CFL  Evaluation Strategy  
3.1. The evaluation problem.  
The CFL was introduced all over the country at the same time.  Firms were not forced to 
participate  in the programme and only “the good ones”10 - firms with a credible training plan, 
and which  had  not fired substantial numbers of workers during the previous year - were 
accepted.   
The control group includes firms that were interested in hiring eligible employees but not 
interested in CFL; firms that applied to the CFL Commission and  received approval but did not 
take  up the programme for various reasons; and firms that applied and whose application was 
rejected. These three categories are not separately identifiable.  
Many applications were rejected, mainly because the training plan presented by the 
applicant was not considered satisfactory11. These firms are particularly good candidates for our 
counterfactual experiment as they presumably share many of the characteristics of the 
participating firms.  Both groups tried to engage in the programme, although, possibly, with 
different intensity.  
Some firms were declared eligible but did not take up the offer of engagement in the 
programme for reasons unknown – possibly there was either a change in the firm’s plans, or 
maybe it had a lack of workers with the required skills - which makes it difficult to devise an 
appropriate control. To our knowledge they are very few, particularly during the first years of the 
programme. The remaining firms were not interested in hiring eligible workers and were 
discarded12. 
                                                 
10 The  concern with spending money on “the bad and the ugly” was politically understandable as CFL was 
supported by the trade unions under a socialist government, so  active policies  from  entrepreneurs was considered 
an essential counterpart to the expenditure of public money. 
11 According to several interviews with former members of the Regional Commission for Employment, almost half 
of the applications were rejected. 
12 The approach was suggested to us by Barbara Sianesi.  
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To assess if the CFL programme improved labour market conditions for young people, an 
Intention to Treat framework (ITT) is necessary. The ITT measures the CFL impact on youth 
employment in general, while the Average Effect of Treatment on the Treated (ATT) measures 
the effect on youth employment in just those firms that took part in the programme. The ATT is 
useful  for studying the reaction of those firms that took part in  the programme to monetary 
incentives and flexibility in labour legislation. At the final stage, the ITT is measured by 
multiplying the ATT value by the fraction of firms that took part in the programme.  
The key question we want to answer is what is the effect of the treatment  on the magnitude 
of youth employment, compared to  what it would be if the treatment had not taken place. Let 
i
Y
1
 
and 
i
Y
0
 be random variables representing the employment stock of eligible workers for  cases of 
treatment and non-treatment respectively. The impact of participating in the programme for any 
firm i is given by Δi = Y1i – Y0i, a measure that is not directly observable as no firm can 
experience both treatment and non-treatment at the same time.  
Let 
i
D  be a binary variable that takes the value 1 if a firm i took up the programme and 0 if it 
did not, and let 
i
X  denote the characteristics of firm i.  What is observed is:  
 
iiiii
YDYDY 01 )1( !+=   (1) 
 
The Average Treatment Effect on the Treated is the average gain due to the programme for 
firms that actually choose to participate: E(  
! 
Y
1
-  
! 
Y
0
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! 
Y
1
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! 
Y
0
|D=1). 
The employment effect of firms in the control group is assumed equal to zero, i.e. firms that 
did not participate in the programme show no effects from its  availability.    
A large majority of firms had the option to participate in the programme, but some firms 
declined. Firms choosing not to participate may differ systematically from participants in respect 
of their levels of motivation and other important characteristics. The difference in motivation (or 
other characteristics) may itself lead to different results for the two groups, and thus bias the 
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study estimates. For example, if the firms entering the programme are more prone to growth, or 
are bigger in size, thus allowing more people to be hired and to take part in the programme, any 
employment increase would be the result of selection and not of the programme. 
 
3.2. The matching assumptions. 
A way out of this dilemma is to address the problem directly by making the two groups, 
treated and untreated firms, comparable on observed characteristics through a process of 
matching. A counterfactual analysis is constructed by identifying a ‘match’ in the control group 
for each treated firm. The key assumption in the matching method is the conditional 
independence assumption (CIA) which states that programme outcomes are independent, and 
conditional on a vector of observable characteristics X 
 
(
  
! 
Y
0
,Y
1
||D)|X (2) 
 
However, when there are many conditioning variables it is extremely difficult to find a proper 
match. A more practical solution is to match on the propensity score, p(X), which is defined as 
the conditional probability of participation given pre-participation characteristics: 
 
  
! 
p(X)= pr(D =1| X) (3) 
 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) demonstrated that if the CIA holds, matching on the 
propensity score results in an unbiased estimate of ATT.  
Matching methods, by choosing and reweighing observations within the common support, 
eliminate biases arising from comparisons of the wrong units (comparing units outside the 
common support region), and biases arising from comparisons of  the right units in the wrong 
proportions (differences in the densities of observable characteristics between treatment and 
comparison units), but not biases arising from  unobservables. The CIA requires that, conditional 
to X, there be no unobserved heterogeneity left that affects the decision to join the programme. 
The CIA thus requires detailed knowledge of the factors that drive participation. In this paper 
the choice of a matching approach is motivated by the richness of the available information 
related to firms’ heterogeneity and to job seekers’ characteristics. 
In general, after having run logit, probit or semiparametric estimations on pre-participation 
variables X, the fitted values, p(X), are used in order to match participants with control units. 
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Following Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1998) the form of the matching estimator can be set in 
the following framework 
 
XXQjiWQiTTA
Ti Cj
ji !"=# #
! !
for        ]),()[(ˆ 01$  (4) 
 
where Q1i is function of the treatment T outcome, Y1i;  Q0j is function of the comparison C 
group outcome, Y0i; W(i,j) is a weight, with 1),( =! "Cj jiW , which depends on p-score and on 
the kind of matching used (nearest-neighbours, kernel, …); ω(i) is a weight that accounts for 
heteroscedasticity and scale; X  is the common support on the treated and untreated units: 
01
XXX != .  
t0 is the date at which the participants entered the programme, t1 is the earlier period and t2 the 
period from t0 onward. Exploiting the panel data information, the ATT estimate is obtained by 
the difference between matching estimates before and after treatment (Heckman et al., 1998). In 
terms of expression (5) the programme outcomes are defined as 
  
! 
Q1i = (Y1it 2 "Y1it1 ) and 
  
! 
Q0j = (Y0jt 2 "Y0jt1 ).  
The identification assumption is the usual conditional independence assumption CIA, in 
differences: 
 
)0,|()1,|( 1212 0000 =!==! DXYYEDXYYE tttt  (5) 
 
i.e. no difference in the outcome trend between non participants and participants when there is 
no treatment. In a context of a linear model with an additively separable error term, u0t, this 
condition is 
 
)0),(|()1),(|( 1212 0000 =!==! DXpuuEDXpuuE tttt  (6) 
 
i.e., in absence of treatment, given appropriate controls, there is no difference in the residuals 
of the outcome trend between non-participants and participants. 
The estimation strategy assumes that the programme does not affect the control group - a 
reasonable assumption because although engagement in the CFL programme in the eighties was 
widely diffused, a large number of young workers were available for hiring by untreated firms. 
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4. Empirical Findings. 
4.1. The employment impact. 
The important questions are how much did youth employment increase in firms that 
participated in the programme, ATT, and how was this reflected in an increase in overall youth 
employment, ITT?. Eligible workers are those aged 21-29, and the age range has been split into 
two classes, 21-24 and 25-2913, in order to separate the programme influence on the less skilled 
workers from its influence on the more skilled workers, likely to have a college or university 
education14. Treated firms are firms that at the stated month in  1986 hired people under the CFL 
(table 3). Untreated firms are defined as firms that did not enter the CFL programme in the same 
month; or they are non- participants or they are not-as-yet participants but might enter the 
programme at a later stage (see page 7)15.  
                                                 
13 The age class 15-20 was excluded for two reasons. Firms can exploit the apprenticeship programme and this blurs 
the results; by excluding the age class 15-20 we get rid of any contamination between the two contracts. Second, the 
extension of school attendance drastically reduced the number of eligible workers over time. 
The panel excludes firms that are established or that failed during the study years, so the possible variation in stock 
due to this natural process is ruled out 
14 The two Veneto provinces are in full employment, so that the termination of full-time education, most of the time, 
matches with the entrance into the labour market.  
15 In terms of the schema on  p. 7: firms that applied successfully but did not take it up, that applied without success, 
and firms interested in hiring young workers outside  the programme. The probability of hiring a worker under CFL 
for firms hiring a eligible worker in 1986 is assumed to be independent from hiring a worker under CFL in the near 
future. See the following par. 4.4. 
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Table 3. Treated Firms and Eligible Worker Cohorts 
Period of observation Number of firms entering the 
programme (participants) 
Pre-treatment Treatment After-treatment Workers 1961-
1964 birth 
cohort* 
Workers 1957-
1960 birth 
cohort° 
1985/1-1985/12 1986/01 1986/02-1986/12 153 49 
1985/2-1986/1 1986/02 1986/02-1987/1 87 39 
1985/3-1986/2 1986/03 1986/03-1987/2 77 26 
1985/4-1986/3 1986/04 1986/04-1987/3 77 27 
1985/5-1986/4 1986/05 1986/05-1987/4 88 32 
1985/6-1986/5 1986/06 1986/06-1987/5 74 23 
1985/7-1986/6 1986/07 1986/07-1987/6 100 33 
1985/8-1986/7 1986/08 1986/08-1987/7 30 11 
1985/9-1986/8 1986/09 1986/09-1987/8 98 37 
1985/10-1986/9 1986/10 1986/10-1987/9 118 53 
1985/11-1986/10 1986/11 1986/11-1987/10 109 47 
1985/12-1986/11 1986/12 1986/12-1987/11 61 19 
Total 1072 396 
*Workers’ age is 21-22 for birth cohort 1964, 22-23 for birth cohort 1963, … 24-25 for birth cohort 1961. 
°Workers’ age is 25-26 for birth cohort 1960, 26-27 for birth cohort 1959, … 28-29 for birth cohort 1957. 
A firm can be present in both groups  Firms that hire only in a single age cohort cannot be used as a control for 
the other age cohort, so that any possible substitution effect is avoided. 
Observable characteristics in the last pre-treatment month are used for selecting for the p-score matching. 
 
Workers are clustered according to birth date. The ATT is estimated through a DID-p.score-
matching estimator and identifies the average effect of the programme as the difference between 
the average outcomes in the participating  group and those in the control group. This is achieved 
by comparing the two groups in terms of the changes in the average monthly employment levels  
of eligible workers over 12 months before, and a similar period after, entering the programme, 
given the appropriate control variables. The entrance date slides through time, from 1.1986 to 
12.198616 and table 3 presents the sliding observation window used in the estimate, with the 
number of firms taking up the programme. The observation window is centred in the entrance 
month, is 24 months long, and slides month after month.  The period of 12 months before and 
after entrance into the programme proves to be long enough so that the result is not blurred with 
extemporaneous spikes.  
Firms choose to participate and this causes an important bias in our estimate. Treated firms’ 
past employment records show that they employed many more young workers in the pre-
treatment period than untreated firms. In addition, treated and untreated firms are remarkably 
different in size and employee composition as reported in table A1 of the appendix. 
                                                 
16 CFL started in 1985 but only a few firms participated, so the programme is evaluated from 1986. 
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Consequently, there is a need to construct a control by identifying a proper ‘match’ in the control 
group for every treated firm. As indicated  earlier, the employment effect of the programme is 
estimated through  a two-stage procedure. First, the matching process sets up a treated and an 
untreated group similar in terms of their propensity scores (table A1 appendix). Second, for each 
firm, the variation in employment stock over time is computed (the difference between pre-
treatment and post-treatment). The ATT estimator (DID p-score matching estimator) is computed 
as the average difference between the matched treated and untreated firms. 
Firms are pooled according to the month in which they joined the programme and a logit 
model for each of the 12 groups is estimated on the following pre-participation exogenous 
variables (measured one month before entering the programme): size, sector, industrial area 
dummies, firm age, number of males, blue-collars  (proxy for capital or labour intensity), 
apprenticeships (proxy for the firm’s inclination to use fixed-term contracts and training 
contracts), eligible workers and the yearly variation of eligible workers. In order to capture non-
linearity, interaction and second order terms are allowed (see table A2 Appendix).  
Yearly variations in the employment of eligible workers in the pre-treatment period are 
included among the variables in order to control for the firms’ different rates of growth. The 
lagged employment variable is a good forecaster for future behaviour of participants as far as 
employment is concerned. The autoregressive estimate of the yearly variations in eligible 
workers in the most recent past is estimated by OLS over the period January 1982 - December 
1984: the coefficient of the lagged employment variable is significantly close to 0,95 with a high 
R2. 
 
Tab. 4: Results of AR(1) Model for the Yearly Variation of Eligible Workers 
Lagged yearly variation of the eligible workers  
(std. err.) 
.9591724 
(.0005126) 
Adj R-squared 0.9049 
 
We matched participant and non-participant firms with the closest p-scores and from the same 
month observation (symmetric difference in difference matching). The calliper nearest-neighbour 
matching with a tolerance under 1% imposes a common support and excludes less than 5% of the 
participant population17. Overall, matching on the estimated propensity score balances the X’s in 
the matched samples extremely well. Seasonality, which is particularly relevant  in the hiring of 
young people, is dealt with by matching treated and control firms month by month and 
                                                 
17 In some cases we imposed not only the nearest neighbour but the 5 nearest. By doing this  the estimate improved 
but the variance increased. The tolerance and the number of comparisons were chosen in order to minimise  outcome 
differences between the two groups during the pre-treatment period. 
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comparing the 12 month pre-treatment period with the 12 month post-treatment period. Twelve 
t
TTA ˆ  are computed, one for each month of treatment, but only the weighted (according to the 
observed number of treated firms in a given month) average of the 
t
TTA ˆ  is reported:  
 
! ="=
t
tt
DDPTTATTA )1|(ˆˆ  t: January, …, December 1986 (7) 
Control group firms are the same across the repeated procedure (14.308 firms), but the specific 
observations used in the logit estimate vary for each group, depending on the specific application 
date. 
Figure 2 shows the monthly employment stock of  21-24 year-old workers (dependent 
variable), both treated and untreated, measured with respect to the average firm’s size (20 
employees), centred in the month in which, for the first time, the firm hires a CFL worker. The 
horizontal axis measures the distance in months in relation to the month that the firm joined the 
programme, which is labelled 0.  
Table 5 reports the ATT estimates from equation 4, summarized according to equation 7. Over  
the treatment period, the number of eligible workers employed by treated firms differed 
significantly from the number of eligible workers employed by untreated firms, and the 
difference is close to 1. The introduction of CFL, evaluated through the DID-p-score matching, 
had a fairly strong effect in increasing employment of  the eligible age cohort in the firms 
participating in the programme . On average, the treated firms each hired one extra  young 
worker more than  the untreated firms.  The outcome is very similar for the two age cohorts.  On 
average, participating firms increased their eligible employment stock by 5%18.  
 
Tab. 5: Estimated Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (DID-p.score-matching). 
Eligible age 
cohorts 21-24 25-29 
TTA ˆ
 
 (bootstrap std. Err.) 
1.101183 
(.0228328) 
.9996684 
(.0235885) 
 
Matching allows us to remove  the main differences between participating  and non-
participating  firms in the 12-month pre-participation period. Some heterogeneity, which is  
fairly constant over time (about 0,2), is still present (fig. 2), and is dealt with successfully by 
                                                 
18 If people hired under the programme were already employed, does a positive coefficient for the programme imply 
an increase in employment? The answer is affirmative. All other things being equal, workers who terminate their 
previous jobs (whether through quitting or being fired ), are probably replaced by new workers, and so the situation 
for the firms that lose their workers remains the same. Sooner or later the system fills the vacancy caused by the new 
CFL hiring with an unemployed worker. 
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DID.  
Fig. 2: Number of 21-24 Year-old Workers by Firm Treatment Status, after P-score-matching 
 
Many studies report a decrease in the probability of employment before participation in a 
programme like CFL. This effect was first observed by Ashenfelter and is therefore referred to as 
Ashenfelter’s dip. The most popular explanation for it is that firms that are planning to take part 
in the programme in the future anticipate their participation and therefore reduce their 
recruitment. Such a dip in employment would cause an over-estimate of the CFL impact19 but 
this possibility is ruled out by the stable pattern of employment shown in figure 2. 
Admission to the programme was limited to firms whose training plans had been approved. 
In fact, several applications were rejected and about 50% of potentially eligible firms did not 
apply20. To assess the programme’s overall impact on youth employment, we must take into 
account the probability that a firm will participate in the programme, which is 1/4, on average, 
for the years 1986-87 (table 6 last row). The impact effect on total net employment for 
participating enterprises is positive and statistically significant, although the overall general 
impact on youth hiring is limited, since it is only a small fraction of the estimated ATT, i.e., 
1.2%. 
                                                 
19 The ‘dip’ typically occurs if firms are selected which experienced  a decline in the number of their employees 
prior to engaging in the programme such that  a  subsequent increase in employment might be attributable to the 
‘dip’ and not to the programme.  
20 Breda (1993, p. 161 ff) 
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Tab. 6: The Number of Firms in Vicenza and Treviso Provinces that Joined the Programme, and 
the Number of Eligible Firms: 1985,1986,1987. 
Year  
1985 1986 1987 1986-87 average 
New firms that joined the 
programme 1044 3912 5514 4713 
Number of eligible firms 24612 22298 18675 20487 
Percentage of firms that joined 
the programme 4.24% 17.54% 29.53% 23.01% 
 
4.2. A sensitivity analysis  
The lagged yearly variation in employment of eligible workers plays an important role in 
identifying the programme’s impact. A sensitivity analysis helps to  understand whether firms 
with different growth rates performed differently in respect to this variable. A simple sensitivity 
analysis looks at the estimated effects on employment in relation to various rates of growth in 
employment experienced by the treated. 
Participating firms are grouped into firms with decreasing, constant and growing employment 
one month prior to treatment21 (–1, 0, +1), and for each set the matching procedure is replicated.  
It is found that  the employment gains are virtually the same across the sub-samples (table 7). 
After joining the programme, firms with decreasing employment increased their stock of eligible 
workers by an average of one additional worker over the pre-treatment stock; the same is true for 
the firms that previously had constant employment; and also for those that had increased their 
stock of employees before joining the programme. 
 
Tab. 7: Estimated Average Tretament on the Treated According to Pre-treatament Growth Rates in 
Employment (DID-p.score-matching). 
Employment 
growth 
< = -1 = 0 > = 1 
Eligible age 
cohorts 21-24 25-29 21-24 25-29 21-24 25-29 
TTA ˆ  
(bootstrap std. err.) 
1.250839    
(.065365) 
1.077297    
(.069879) 
.9748806    
(.013941) 
.9732956     
(.017048) 
1.28522    
(.048300) 
.9856224    
(.076903) 
 
4.3. Income and substitution effect.  
Did the increase in employment of eligible workers lead to the displacement of other workers 
so that the overall result was less satisfactory than assumed? The employment increase in the age 
                                                 
21 Most of the participating firms had a growth rate equal to zero, which is also the median. The extension of  
coverage to more months previous to treatment  altered the relative number of firms belonging to the three groups 
but did not alter the estimate results. 
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cohort 21-29 might be at the cost of a parallel employment decline in younger or older workers. 
An assessment of whether the programme did have such an impact needs to proceed net of the 
so-called “bookkeeping” effects.  
 
Figure 3. Hiring by Participant Firms  
a. 
 
 
 
b 
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Figure 3a and 3b provide a first descriptive answer. The behaviour of treated firms in the 
participation period (1986), and in the pre-participation period (1985), is compared in relation to 
the hiring of eligible and non eligible workers. Participating firms in 1986 hire more 21 year old 
relative to 20 year old workers than in the pre-participation period (See fig. 3a left and 3a right, 
vertical axes), and roughly the same number of 29 year old relative to 30 year old workers (See 
fig. 3b left and 3b right, vertical axes). This indicates that in the participation period treated firms 
have recruited a greater proportion of eligible workers in relation to non-eligible workers 
particularly at the lower age margin; a sign of a possible substitution effect that is absent at the 
upper age margin. But a definite conclusion about a possible displacement effect would require a 
more sophisticated analysis.  
A reduction in the cost of a group of workers has two standard effects: a substitution effect, 
and an “income” effect - whereby firms may save money and so “increase their income” which 
could be spent on hiring more workers – both eligible and non-eligible. The fact that eligible firms 
might have hired non eligible workers at the upper margin might simply reflect a strong 
“income” effect rather than the absence of substitution effect. In order to check for an “income” 
effect we extended the analysis to workers in the age group 35-40. They are less prone to the 
substitution effect but might have been influenced by an “income” effect.  Mature workers have 
different experiences and skills compared with those participating in the CFL programme, who 
are mainly new entrants, and are liable to play a very different role in the firm’s organization.  A 
substitution of workers in the 35-40 age group by eligible (younger) workers participating in CFL 
is probably very limited, while a positive “income” effect for the firm will be reflected in a 
general increase in hiring in all age classes. 
In order to test the magnitude of the substitution and “income” effects we computed the 
Average Effect on the Treated in respect of employment variations for the age classes, 15-20, 30-
32, 35-40 experienced by participant and non-participant firms (with participating firms being  
defined as those who employ under CFL workers from  eligible age classes: 21-24; 25-29). (Table 
8) 22. 
 
 
 
                                                 
22 We have limited ourselves to 40 years of age because older workers would introduce much heterogeneity in the 
sample. 
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Tab. 8: Estimated Average Treatment Effect on the Treated Computed with Respect to the Age 
classes 15-20; 30-32; 35-40. (DID p.score-matching) 
Eligible age class: 21-24 Eligible age class: 25-29 
TTA ˆ 15-20 cohort 
(bootstrap std. err.) 
.1576029 
(.0226783) 
TTA ˆ 30-32 cohort 
(bootstrap std. err.) 
-.0031796 
(.0158533) 
TTA ˆ 35-40 cohort  
(bootstrap std. err.) 
.0022628 
(.0133871) 
 
The relative difference in employment for the age class 35-40 between treated and control 
groups is insignificant and confirms the absence of a positive “income” effect for participating 
firms (Table 8). There is a positive, but minimal CFL effect on the employment of workers aged 
15-20 (negative substitution or complementarity between workers of the two age classes 15-20 
and 21-24) measured by 1 more employee for every 5 firms of average size, i.e. approximately 1 
in 100 workers, but the CFL net effect on the 21-24 years old workers is 5 times as big. The 
relative difference in employment for the age class 30-32 between treated and control groups is 
insignificant and confirms the absence of a positive substitution effect (Table 8).  
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4.4. Selection bias.  
Matching estimators mimic a randomized experiment ex-post by constructing a comparison 
group as similar as possible to the treatment group. Even with the most informative data, 
matching can only control for observable differences between the treatment and comparison 
groups, and the method assumes that there is no remaining unobserved heterogeneity between the 
two groups that could possibly bias the treatment effect estimate (Kluwe, Schmidt, 2002, p. 
427). Eligible workers were not only hired by participants through a CFL contract, but also by 
participants through an open-ended contract, and also by non-participants. Why would any firm 
hire an eligible worker without using CFL? Possibly different firms hire different kinds of young 
people and this can make control firms different in their hiring policies.  
Different propensities to hire eligible workers on CFL contracts suggest the possibility of 
unobserved heterogeneity between the two groups. The obvious explanation for varying 
propensities to employ eligible workers on CFL contracts is that in order to employ better young 
people – i.e. high-quality employees who want a long-term relationship with the firm - an open-
ended contract is required.  Some firms may have targeted ”the cream of the crop”;  other firms 
maybe went for “bulk purchase and discount” 23.  If this is true, our control group would prove 
inappropriate. Firms with growing employment needs chose to participate while firms more 
prone to high quality growth, and requiring a limited number of workers, went into the control 
group, and the positive outcome for the participants is the result of selection. 
In fact, participants hired a substantial number of eligible young workers on open-ended 
contracts in the same month that they hired CFL workers. Among all workers hired by 
participants, 49% were CFL employees and the rest were hired on open-ended contracts, a clear 
sign that many participants choose to use the two contracts in parallel, with selection in mind. 
Adding a new worker to the CFL project would not have proved particularly expensive, but 
entrepreneurs had other reasons to choose high quality workers. Firms use the new CFL contract 
in parallel with the open-ended contract, with its higher wages, for selection purposes, but this 
behaviour seems not to affect crucially the composition of our control group. Both types of 
firms, treated and untreated, hired eligible workers on open-ended contracts; both were sensitive 
to the labour supply portion that could be attracted by offering better employment conditions; 
and both hired a mix of ordinary and high quality workers24. 
                                                 
23 The segmentation of the labour market due to the diffusion of fixed-term contracts in recent years, is considered, 
for example, by Boeri, 1999; Blanchard and Landier, 2002; Cipollone and Guelfi, 2005. 
24 Firms in the control group include a substantial number of firms whose application was rejected, and their demand 
for labour was presumably very similar to the demand for labour expressed by the treated firms. 
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5. The CFL Reforms 
 
The CFL reforms, in June 1988 and January 1991, reduced the financial rebate for 
participating  non-artisan firms by 50%, twice, leaving the benefit intact for artisans (table 1).  
The benefits related to  contract flexibility were basically untouched. Very few firms joined the 
programme after the reform and the CFL was mainly used by artisan firms, and had a limited 
effect on total employment. 
The effect of the reforms on the firms that chose to join is now the most interesting question.  
Given that, when launched, the programme had many adherents and that the programme 
significantly altered firms’ behaviour25, one would expect that those firms that lost the financial 
benefits (non-artisan firms) would return to their starting situation. Surprisingly, non-artisan 
firms that originally took up the programme carried on with the same employment as before.  
The ATT  estimates the average employment variation due to the programme reforms on firms 
with ongoing CFL participation.  Treated and control groups are non-artisan and artisan firms.  
Tthe parameter estimate is an ATT conditional to those firms who joined the CFL programme at 
baseline. 
 Treated and control firms are exogenously identified (They belong to the non-artisan or 
artisan set), and the basic problem is heterogeneity between the treated and the control groups, 
i.e. a problem of diversity, not a problem of selection such as the one we encountered in the 
previous sections. 
 Observable heterogeneity is controlled by the matching procedure. Artisan and non-artisan 
firms differ primarily in size and sector, and matching ‘loses’ about half of treated firms. Even 
after matching and balancing the observable variables - the stock of eligible workers for artisan 
and non-artisan firms - in the period before the reforms artisan and non-artisan firms exhibit  
different patterns through time. This heterogeneity26 can be addressed by using regression-
adjusted matching27. Heckman, Ichimura, Todd (1998) combine the matching method and 
regression adjustment on the X.  Their method extends beyond the classical matching process by 
utilizing information about the functional form of the outcome equation and by directly 
confronting the problem of the difference in behaviour over the pre-treatment period.  
                                                 
25 Empirical observations show that the benefit reduction was accompanied by a drastic fall in the number of non-
artisan firms joining the programme. 
26 Blundell et al. (2003) observe that “for the evaluation to make sense with heterogeneous effects, we must 
guarantee that the distribution of the relevant observable characteristics is the same in the four cells defined by 
eligibility and time”. They suggest using two propensity scores: one for eligibility and one for the time period.      
27 We do not use this technique in the previous analysis because the lagged employment variation of the eligible 
workers accounted for any self-selection. Thus, after matching there was no a-priori reason to expect a different 
response to the cycle from treated and untreated firms (table 5 and figure 2). 
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Regression-adjusted matching is performed through the following procedure (Heckman et al., 
1998). Assume a conventional econometric model for outcomes in the untreated state that is 
additively separable in the observable X and unobservable characteristics U: 
 
)0,|()0,|( 000 =+== DXUEXDXYE !  (8) 
 
Before estimating ATT  by matching methods (5), 
0
!ˆX  is removed from 
0
Y  and 
1
Y  by setting 
)ˆ( 011 !iij XYQ "=  and )ˆ( 000 !jjj XYQ "= .  
In order  to account for the different reactions to the business cycle by the treated and the 
untreated firms, the amount  of non-CFL recruitment is considered. Indeed, treated (non-artisan) 
firms and control (artisan) firms have a different cyclical behaviour through time – previous 
controls given – and a focus on non-CFL recruitments for the two categories of firms captures a 
picture of the variability that derives from  the cycle effect. 28. Figure 4 plots the residuals of the 
regression of the employment variable for the treated for the age class 21-24 after regression-
adjusted matching, once observable factors have been properly controlled for. The horizontal 
axis measures the time, in months, in relation to the beginning of the first reform in 1988, which  
is labelled 0.  
 
Fig.4: Residuals of the Regression Y1i = Xiβ0 + ui and Confidence Interval Constructed 
Around the Residuals of the Regression Y0j = Xjβ0 + uj 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
28 Observables are quite balanced between treated and untreated firms. Results are available on request. 
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Tab. 10: Estimated Average Treatment Effect on the Treated in Relation to the Two 
CFL Reforms (DID p.score-matching). 
Reform period examined from 6.1988 to 5.1989 from 1.1991 to 12.1991  
Eligible age cohort 21-24 25-29 21-24 25-29 
TTA ˆ
 
(bootstrap std. err.) 
.107756 
(.017400) 
-.020937 
(.029064) 
.043564 
(.010108) 
.025117 
(.013646) 
 
Firms that were faced with a much reduced financial benefit, did significantly cut the number 
of their new CFL contracts29, but youth employment in the eligible age classes did not decline.  
One possible explanation for this lies in the rigidity of labour demand by the firms. Once a 
firm joined the programme, its structure adapted to the new situation (in terms of production 
volumes, market positioning, and other aspects). The enterprise was faced with a choice between 
retaining the CFL worker as soon as the contract came to maturity (50% on average were 
retained30), or shifting to a new worker, but it was unwilling to decrease the employment level, 
all other things being equal, despite the fact that the financial benefit had been reduced. So 
treated and control firms do not behave differently as far as the ongoing employment level of the 
eligible workers is concerned, although new CFL recruitment was only undertaken by artisan 
firms31.  
 
6. Conclusions 
The CFL programme was introduced in Italy in 1985, to relieve youth unemployment. The 
programme provided firms with a substantial reduction in social security contributions and a 
wage reduction; it was virtually the only fixed term contract available for employers, having a 
maximum duration of two years; it allowed firms to hire directly without having to go through a 
government agency. This paper has argued that CFL was conducive to net job creation by firms 
that took it up because employers that took part in the programme strongly reacted to the fiscal 
benefits, the opportunities for direct hiring and the determinate duration of the contracts. 
Our results complement the study by Contini, Cornaglia, Malpede and Rettore, which 
measured the impact of the programme on youth employment at the national level through the 
analysis of  temporal and territorial variations in  relative labour costs for  eligible employers, but 
found no evidence of a policy impact (Contini et al., 2002). Our richer dataset allows us to 
evaluate the programme’s consequence on for the number of young people hired by the 
                                                 
29 In a couple of years new CFL in Treviso and Vicenza almost halved, Breda (1993, p. 167). If artisan firms did not 
change their attitude, CFL by non artisan firms were reduced to very small numbers, indeed. 
30 Breda (1993, p. 167). 
31 The result is only in part due to the fact that about 50% of  CFL contracts were transformed into open end 
contracts: the employee stock of  untreated firms is stable independent of such  transformations.   
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participating firms and so produce a more informative estimate. Firms reacted promptly to the 
programme, and the average treatment effect on the treated is statistically significant and positive. 
The indirect effect of the programme on workers outside the targeted group has been scrutinized 
and no sizeable substitution effect has emerged, leading us to conclude that the impact of the 
intervention on the targeted group produced  a positive net effect for  the economy. In contrast to 
Contini at al. (2002) our study provides new evidence supporting active labour market  
interventions, also in the face  of many sceptical findings  for other European countries (Kluwe, 
Schmidt, 2002). 
The size of the overall effect in Treviso and Vicenza provinces was lessened by the 
programme’s limited diffusion, and this had at least two causes. First, in a very rigid labour 
market, where terms and conditions of employment were negotiated in detail at the national level, 
firms took advantage of the new contract form – to separate the wheat from the chaff. Better 
educated workers or, generally speaking, workers with higher productivity, were offered open-
ended contracts and higher entrance wages, while low productivity workers were hired through 
CFL, on fixed-term contracts and lower wages. Thus, CFL aided the process of screening workers 
for their job suitability. The occurrence of the programme intervention in a very rigid situation 
fostered competition among workers, and among firms, and improved the economy’s 
employment performance. This argument is one of the main policy directions identified by the 
Manpower and Social Affairs Committee of the OECD (Kluve, Schmidt, 2002, p. 421). Second, 
the programme was burdened by a series of restrictions aimed at selecting “good” employers. 
Employers were selected on the basis of  an employment history free of recent substantial firings 
in order to avoid subsidizing firms which might have reduced  employment prior to engaging in 
the programme with the intention of re-hiring previously employed youths on a temporary 
employment basis. Also, many applications were rejected on the grounds that the proposed 
training programmes they offered were poor.  
The main  lesson we can derive from the Italian experience is that the CFL programme had net, 
but limited, positive results on youth employment.  To be an effective programme entry 
contracts must be framed in a sufficiently general and flexible framework, be able to take account 
of various forms of labour heterogeneity and skills, and, in order to reach a wide audience, must 
be relatively simple and not burdened by excessive bureaucratic impediments. 
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Appendix  
Table A1 presents  statistics used in the matching procedure, comparing  the treated and 
untreated firms on a number of variables before and after matching for 21-24 year-old workers in 
1986. Matching makes the observable characteristics of treated and untreated firms very close. 
 
Tab. A1: Selected variables before and after matching in 1986 for 21-24 year-old 
workers (standard errors in brackets) 
Before matching  After matching  Variable 
Untreated Treated. Untreated Treated. 
Artisan 
 
0.486674 
(0.499824) 
0.309595 
(0.462555) 
0.319580 
(0.466542) 
0.322266 
(0.467572) 
Size 
 
9.402192 
(28.54818) 
40.77052 
(191.3818) 
20.31966 
(36.94924) 
21.61426 
(43.51913) 
Firm’s age 
 
7.939438 
(7.523244) 
3.240337 
(3.298095) 
7.356364 
(3.291211) 
7.347656 
(3.294926) 
Number of males 5.768556 
(26.83482) 
20.05857 
(136.6268) 
13.57259 
(29.23727) 
13.89453 
(30.03775) 
Number of Blue Collar 
workers 
7.505811 
(28.44313) 
22.18906 
(121.1931) 
16.27197 
(30.34577) 
16.85449 
(35.37205) 
Number of Apprentices 0.934651 
(1.529179) 
1.750039 
(3.037047) 
1.355062 
(2.407525) 
1.34082 
(2.261941) 
Number of Workers under 
20 years old 
1.437891 
(3.192878) 
2.481867 
(5.5.35429) 
2.376709 
(3.554734) 
2.453125 
(3.455307) 
Number of Workers 
between 21 and 24 years old 
1.649114 
(6.086053) 
3.303712 
(10.47834) 
3.458745 
(5.189902) 
3.662109 
(4.863844) 
Number of Workers 
between 25 and 29 years old 
1.621119 
(6.869436) 
4.527697 
(30.31506) 
3.666585 
(6.653488) 
3.891602 
(7.507505) 
Number of Workers 
between 30 and 32 years old 
0.768825 
(3.503462) 
3.284795 
(18.13499) 
1.730469 
(3.90936) 
1.900391 
(4.673697) 
Number of Workers 
between 33 and 35 years old 
0.645664 
(3.163205) 
3.616331 
(19.0575) 
1.47583 
(3.606509) 
1.523438 
(4.436523) 
Lag Eligible Stock 
Variation 
-0.01924 
(1.355094) 
1.049493 
(2.652389) 
0.065104 
(2,005692) 
0.081055 
(1.330987) 
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Before matching some variables are highly significant and these are the most important 
variables for selection into the program. When running the same estimation after matching no 
variable is significant, and this is clear evidence that the balancing procedure worked very 
efficiently.. 
 
Table A2:  Coefficients of the logit estimation (p-values in brackets) 
Variables Before-
matching 
After-matching 
-1.1502 -0.16381 Artisan Firm 
(0.000) (0.688) 
0.023211 0.07114 Size 
(0.042) (0.102) 
-0.08273 0.05029 
Firm’s age (0.551) (0.812) 
-0.0079 -0.00805 Number of males 
(0.187) (0.513) 
-0.01327 -0.04522 Number of Blue Collar 
workers (0.073) (0.055) 
0.072632 0.03765 Number of Apprentices 
(0.196) (0.716) 
0.014904 -0.01115 Number of Workers under 
20 years old (0.565) (0.854) 
0.027207 -0.0238 Number of Workers between 21 
and 24 years old (0.246) (0.66) 
-0.00094 -0.01043 Number of Workers between 25 
and 29 years old (0.967) (0.791) 
0.0095 0.01247 Number of Workers between 30 
and 32 years old (0.828) (0.848) 
0.035217 -0.06893 Number of Workers between 33 
and 35 years old (0.429) (0.430) 
0.112311 0.03138 Lag Eligible Stock Variation 
(0.022) (0.721) 
Territorial Dummies Yes Yes 
Sector Dummies Yes Yes 
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